I. INTRODUCTION
In 1989, in an article published in one of this law school's journals, Indiana Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard issued a call for renewed attention to the Indiana Constitution. In that article, he encouraged lawyers to present and judges to 1 consider arguments based on the Indiana Constitution. He wrote, "The ability of [the Indiana Supreme Court] and other Indiana courts to write good law about the Indiana Bill of Rights depends in important part upon good lawyering by those who appear before us." He added, "The protection of Americans against tyranny 2 requires that state supreme courts and state constitutions be strong centers of authority on the rights of the people." When Chief Justice Shepard issued this 3 call, Justice Brent E. Dickson had been a member of the Indiana Supreme Court and had served together with him for about three years. 5. They served together for over twenty-six years. 6. They served with colleagues who also made important contributions to Indiana constitutional law. For instance, Justice Alfred J. Pivarnik interpreted and applied article 1, section 32 (recognizing the right to bear arms for the defense of one's self and the state) in Kellogg v. City of Gary, 562 N.E.2d 685 (Ind. 1990 ). Justice Jon D. Krahulik interpreted and applied article 1, section 12 (recognizing a right to remedy by due course of law) in State v. Rendleman, 603 N.E.2d 1333 (Ind. 1992) . Likewise, Justice Frank Sullivan, Jr. interpreted an array of Indiana constitutional Justice Dickson's contributions to Indiana constitutional law grew out of his longstanding interest in history and government. As a student at Purdue University, he studied American history and government, and then he studied 10 law at Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law. When he was 11 practicing law in Lafayette, Indiana, he served as president and was on the board of governors of the Tippecanoe County Historical Association. His interest in 12 Indiana history and government is also evident in articles he wrote recounting Indiana's constitutional history and discussing the role of lawyers and judges in writing the Indiana Constitution. Additionally, his regard for Indiana history and 13 government is apparent from his service as an adjunct professor at the Indiana University law schools at Bloomington and Indianapolis where he, for more than a decade, taught Indiana constitutional law and the history surrounding the adoption of Indiana's first and second constitutions. (Ind. 2005 ) (Dickson, J., concurring in result)), he also interpreted the constitutional prohibition against the Indiana General Assembly granting privileges or immunities that are not equally available to all (Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72 (Ind. 1994) ), and the requirement that the legislative and executive branches provide a property tax system characterized by uniformity, equality, and just valuation of property (Boehm v. Town of St. John, 675 N.E.2d 318 (Ind. 1996) agreed with the majority in several respects: the various religion provisions of the Indiana Constitution prevent Indiana government "from imposing material burdens on the exercise of religious practice"; "this protection extends beyond the private devotion vel non of individuals and also includes the public and group activities associated with religious practices"; and the city "may not exercise its right of eminent domain in such a way as to materially burden City Chapel's religious activities." He concluded, however, that City Chapel had not presented 32 a claim that its religious activities were materially burdened, that the church's 33 complaint was closer to a claim under the takings provision of the Indiana Constitution, that the church was not entitled to a hearing because it had not 34 presented a claim that bars the taking, and that the church had not stated a 35 hybrid claim under the First Amendment.
36
In Embry, the court considered a challenge by taxpayers to the state's dualenrollment program, which permitted nonpublic school students enrolled in at least one specific class in a public school corporation to be counted in that school corporation's average daily membership. Under this program, participating 37 public school corporations can enter into dual-enrollment agreements with private schools and provide various secular instructional services (such as courses in fitness and health, art, foreign language, study skills, verbal skills, music, and computer technology) to private school students on the premises of private schools and receive additional funding for the enrollment of those students. Boehm expressed agreement with the majority as to its disposition of the standing issue and its holding that "expenditure of public funds for proper educational purposes is not 'for the benefit of' a religious institution even if the delivery point of the educational services is a parochial school." Justice Boehm disagreed, 47 however, with the majority's reasoning that article 1, section 6 did not foreclose the public funding of parochial or sectarian schools; instead, he believed that article 1, section 6 "stands squarely against that proposition." 48 In Meredith, the court considered a challenge to Indiana's Choice Scholarship Program, which provides vouchers ("choice scholarships") to eligible parents 49 so that they have the choice to send their children to a public school, a charter school, or a qualified private school. The challengers argued that Indiana's 50 school voucher program violated three separate provisions of the Indiana Constitution-article 8, section 1 (of the Education Article), and article 1, sections 4 and 6 (two religion provisions of the Indiana Bill of Rights). More 51 specifically, the challengers argued that the program "uses taxpayer funds to pay for the teaching of religion to Indiana schoolchildren and [that] it purports to provide those children's publicly funded education by paying tuition for them to a search for the common understanding of both those who framed it and those who ratified it. Furthermore, the intent of the framers of the Constitution is paramount in determining the meaning of a provision. In order to give life to their intended meaning, we examine the language of the text in the context of the history surrounding its drafting and ratification, the purpose and structure of our constitution, and case law interpreting the specific provisions. In construing the constitution, we look to the history of the times, and examine the state of things existing when the constitution or any part thereof was framed and adopted, to ascertain the old law, the mischief, and the remedy. The language of each provision of the Constitution must be treated with particular deference, as though every word had been hammered into place. (1) The court searches for the common understanding of a constitutional provision that was shared by the framers and the ratifiers.
61
(2) The court keeps paramount in interpreting a provision the intended meaning of the framers.
62
(3) To give effect to the framers' intended meaning, the court carefully examines the language of the text, taking into consideration several additional factors:
(a) The historical context in which the text was drafted and ratified; (b) The Indiana Constitution's purpose and structure; and (c) The case law interpreting the constitutional provision.
63
(4) The court studies the broader historical context and the "state of things existing" at the time the constitution or any specific provision was drafted and adopted, seeking to ascertain the intended meaning from several additional inputs: (Ind. 1991) ). In Collins, Justice Dickson wrote: "Properly interpreting a particular provision of the Indiana Constitution involves a search for the common understanding of both those who framed it and those who ratified it." 644 N.E.2d at 75-76 (citing Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d at 412). In Sonnenburg, Chief Justice Shepard wrote: "This Court has regarded the task of interpreting particular provisions of the Indiana Constitution as a search for the common understanding of both those who framed it and those who ratified it." 573 N.E.2d at 412 (internal citations omitted).
68. The framers left us little to discern their intention about the meaning of the phrase "resident of the State." The history of this provision, the purpose of the residency requirement, and the caselaw defining residence in other contexts lead us to interpret "resident of" in art. V, § 7 to mean domiciliary. 521 N.E.2d at 1316.
70. McIntosh, 729 N.E.2d at 986 (quoting Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d at 412). In Sonnenburg, Chief Justice Shepard wrote:
We have also said that "in placing a construction upon a constitution or any clause or part thereof, a court should look to the history of the times, and examine the state of things existing when the constitution or any part thereof was framed and adopted, to ascertain the old law, the mischief, and the remedy." State v. Gibson (1871), 36 Ind. 389, 391. 573 N.E.2d at 412. In Gibson, Justice Buskirk wrote:
It is settled by very high authority, that, in placing a construction upon a constitution or any clause or part thereof, a court should look to the history of the times, and examine the state of things existing when the constitution or any part thereof was framed and adopted, to ascertain the old law, the mischief, and the remedy. The court should also look to the nature and objects of the particular powers, duties, and rights in question, with all the light and aids of co[n]temporary history, and give to the words of each provision just such operation and force, consistent with their legitimate meaning, as will fairly secure the end proposed. 76. In City Chapel, Justice Dickson consulted the definitions of "secure" and "worship" in a dictionary published around the time of the 1850-1851 Indiana Constitutional Convention to understand how the framers would have defined these terms. 744 N.E.2d at 448 (quoting NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1000, 1273 (George & Charles Merriam eds., 1856)). In Embry, he consulted that same dictionary for a definition of the word "ministry." 798 N.E.2d at 161 (quoting WEBSTER, supra, at 716). In Meredith, he returned to the definitions of the terms "worship" and "ministry" and reviewed the dictionary definition of "ministry" discussed in his Embry opinion. 984 N.E.2d at 1226 (quoting Embry, 978 N.E.2d at 161 (quoting WEBSTER, supra)).
77 that the drafters and the ratifiers of the Indiana religion provisions "did not copy or paraphrase the 1791 language of the federal First Amendment," which 81 provides that Congress "shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Rather, they "adopted seven Finding that Indiana's religious freedom provisions "were not intended merely to mirror the federal First Amendment," he concluded that they should not "be 85 equated with" the federal provisions and that First Amendment jurisprudence should not "govern[] the interpretation of our state guarantees." 86 Also in City Chapel, Justice Dickson, after noting the differences in language between the Indiana religion provisions and the First Amendment, placed Indiana's religion provisions in the broader context of the Indiana Constitution's purpose and structure. He noted the Indiana Constitution's recognition of the state's police power in article 1, section 1, which declares that government is instituted for the "peace, safety, and well-being" of the people, and the Preamble 87 to the Indiana Constitution, which declares that the constitution has been ordained to establish justice, maintain public order, and perpetuate liberty. In Embry, Justice Dickson discussed historical facts related to the adoption of the seven religion provisions that he had not discussed in his City Chapel opinion, including the processes by which the provisions were introduced and considered in the 1850-1851 Indiana Constitutional Convention and the vote approving the provisions.
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In Meredith, Justice Dickson emphasized the importance of not conflating separate religion provisions and the need to recognize the distinct objectives the framers had in mind when drafting separate religion provisions. In discussing 93 article 1, sections 4 and 6, he observed that the distinctions in language between those sections were "purposeful" and that these provisions "were drafted to specify separate and distinct objectives in their respective restraints upon government." The language distinctions between sections 4 and 6 thus show, found that the term "secure" means (both then and now) "[t]o make certain, to put beyond hazard." Looking at the same contemporaneously-published dictionary, 100 he also noted that the term "worship" means "chiefly and eminently, the act of paying divine honors to the Supreme Being; or the reverence and homage paid to him in religious exercises consisting in adoration, confession, prayer, thanksgiving, and the like. Constitutional Convention adopted section 3 as the Committee on Rights and Privileges had proposed it without debate. Nevertheless, he found the text clear 106 and unequivocal, and he observed that the phrase "'in any case whatever' demonstrates the framers' and ratifiers' intent to provide unrestrained protection for the articulated values." He then considered various historical resources to 107 gain insight regarding religion and religious practice in nineteenth-century Indiana, and he noted that religious worship and the exercise of religious opinion were collective activities "practiced in diverse traditions by a variety of religious denominations." He also noted that the section 7 prohibition against a person of administering an oath or affirmation shall be such as may be most consistent with, and binding upon, the conscience of the person, to whom such oath or affirmation may be administered" underscore the respect the framers and the ratifiers had for the variety of religious opinions and practices that were flourishing in Indiana by the middle of the nineteenth century.
109
Justice Dickson also consulted historical sources regarding the adoption of religious liberty provisions in other states at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century, noting similarities and differences in terminology. Additionally, he noted that in Smith v. Pedigo, one of the Indiana 110 Supreme Court's earliest interpretations of Indiana's religion provisions, the court emphasized that both belief and practice were within the scope of the religious liberty protections of the Indiana Bill of Rights. The Smith court, he wrote, had 111 "generally observed that the religious liberty clauses 'take away all power of the State to interfere with religious beliefs' and that, 'in other words, the law allows every one [sic] to believe as he pleases, and practice that belief so long as that practice does not interfere with the equal rights of others. '" 112 Having studied the text, convention materials, and other historical resources, he found that the framers and the ratifiers did not intend the religious freedom provisions "to afford only narrow protection for a person's internal thoughts and private practices of religion and conscience." Rather, he continued, 113 By protecting the right to worship according to the dictates of conscience and the rights freely to exercise religious opinion and to act in accord with personal conscience, Sections 2 and 3 advance core values that restrain government interference with the practice of religious worship, both in private and in community with other persons. consideration was guided by the constitutional text, which he noted is the "primary source" for "discerning the common understanding of the framers and ratifiers." Applying the Price/Whittington framework, he concluded that 118 119 section 4, together with sections 2 and 3, advance core constitutional values that government in Indiana may not materially burden.
120
In Meredith, Chief Justice Dickson noted that the court in City Chapel had determined that the Indiana religion provisions were not intended to mirror the First Amendment and that section 4 was adapted from the 1816 Indiana Constitution. He explained that section 4 "explicitly prohibits a person from 121 being 'compelled to attend, erect, or support' a place of worship or a ministry against his consent." Section 4, which he insisted must not be conflated with Article 1, section 6 declares, "No money shall be drawn from the treasury, for In Embry, Justice Dickson studied the text and noted that the language of this provision did not appear in the 1816 Indiana Constitution and that the provision resulted from the 1850-1851 Indiana Constitutional Convention. He also noted 130 that the available historical record from the convention did not reflect any substantive discussion regarding section 6.
131
He found, however, that the address of Delegate Robert Dale Owen, the chair of the Committee on the Rights and Privileges, given at the end of the Indiana Constitutional Convention, provided insight into the intentions of the framers. In this address, Owen explained:
In addition to the guarantees [that] find a place in the old Constitution, to secure the rights of conscience and prevent the imposition, on the citizen, of any tax to support any ministry or mode of worship against his consent, it is provided, that no person shall be rendered incompetent as a witness, in consequence of his opinions in matters of religion; and that no money shall be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of any religious or theological institution. Both these provisions are found in the constitutions of Michigan, Wisconsin, and others of recent date.
132
Justice Dickson observed that Owen's remark about the aim of preventing the imposition of any tax to support any ministry or mode of worship did "not expressly include or make any reference to educational institutions with religious affiliations." Additionally, because the term "ministry" was defined at the time 133 of the convention to mean ecclesiastical function or profession and agency or service of a minister, a clergyperson, a priest, an apostle, or an evangelist, the framers may have "intended Section 6 to prohibit public funds only for ecclesiastical functions." that the court did not need to decide "whether the framers and ratifiers intended Section 6 to apply to religious schools" because the case could be resolved on another basis.
140
That other basis was the "for the benefit of" language of section 6, and the specific question was whether the dual-enrollment program "confer [red] substantial benefits upon the participating parochial schools" or "directly fund[ed] activities of a religious nature." Justice Dickson determined:
141
Neither the text of Section 6 nor the circumstances surrounding its adoption . . . provide guidance as to whether the phrase "for the benefit of" in Section 6 was intended to erect an absolute prohibition against any expenditure of public money that might confer merely pecuniary incidental benefit to a religious institution. those cases had determined that section 6 was not violated either by an arrangement between a municipal government and parochial schools to conduct public schools in parochial school buildings with parochial school staff hired by the public schools or by agreements between a municipal government and religious mission shelters to provide services to the township's homeless.
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After discussing these two Indiana cases, Justice Dickson considered how courts in Wisconsin and Michigan had interpreted and applied the counterpart provisions of their state constitutions. He found that the courts in those states 146 had determined that their state constitutions were not violated in several situations when the benefits to the church-related institution or the religious organization are incidental or the principal or primary effect is not to advance religion. Those permissible situations were: (1) a statute authorizing payment of public funds pursuant to a contract with a church-related university to provide services; (2) a statute authorizing public school boards to contract with private educational providers (including religious organizations) for the provision of special educational services; (3) a statute authorizing public school teachers to be paid with public funds to teach secular subjects in private schools; and (4) an agreement between a government agency and a church to lease property for valid consideration. He concluded that the courts in Wisconsin and Michigan in these 148 cases reached interpretations consistent with the decisions reached in the two Indiana cases (Boyd and Coe).
149
Justice Dickson then compared the benefits received by Indiana children, the state, and public school systems with the benefits received by parochial schools under the dual-enrollment program. He found that, from the program, Indiana 150 children receive significant educational benefits, the State of Indiana receives the benefit of attaining its educational objectives, and the public school systems receive benefit in the form of additional funding. As to the benefits received by 151 parochial schools, he found that "any alleged 'savings' to parochial schools and their resulting opportunities for curriculum expansion would be, at best, relatively minor and incidental benefits of the dual-enrollment program." Accordingly, 152 he concluded that the program did not confer substantial benefits upon any religious or theological institution or directly fund activities of a religious nature, and thus, that the program did not violate section 6.
153
In his Meredith opinion, Chief Justice Dickson's discussion of section 6 built upon his discussion of section 4, and he observed that "the framers crafted Section 6 [to restrain] government not as to its compulsion of individuals, but rather its expenditure of funds for certain prohibited purposes." Thus, distinct 154 from section 4, which prohibits government compulsion to engage in religious practices absent consent, section 6 applies to government "taxing and spending related to religious matters" and prohibits "expenditures to benefit religious or theological institutions." 155 Chief Justice Dickson determined that "Section 6 prohibits government expenditures that directly benefit any religious or theological institution" and that " [a] after Meredith is whether the expenditure directly benefits a religious or theological institution.
162
In the case of the voucher program, he found that the families of eligible students (especially lower-income families) are the direct beneficiaries, that the program does not directly fund any religious activities because no funds are dispersed without the private, independent choice of the parents of eligible students, and that parent participation is entirely voluntary. Consequently, any 163 benefit that program-eligible schools (both religious and nonreligious) receive derives from the choice of parents and is ancillary and incidental to the benefit conferred on the families of eligible students. 164 As to the question of whether any of the eligible schools are "religious or theological institution[s]" under section 6, Chief Justice Dickson returned to an issue left unresolved in his Embry opinion. He noted that, in his Embry opinion, he had determined that the primary and secondary education available to Indiana children in the first half of the nineteenth century "was predominantly provided by private or religious entities" and that "the teaching of religious subject matter was an essential component of [a] His opinions in these cases also reveal his underlying belief that the framers crafted the constitutional provisions to have precise meanings. His primary aim in applying the court's method and conducting careful historical investigation was to retrieve from the historically-situated text the meanings intended by the framers and the ratifiers by bridging the two worlds-the world of the framers, the ratifiers, and the constitutional text, and the world of the interpreter. His opinions manifest a confidence that the court's method will help to unlock the intended meanings and allow the court to faithfully apply those intended meanings in contemporary situations.
The Rule of Law-Acknowledging That the Judicial Interpreter Is Under
Law.-In seeking the understanding of the framers and the ratifiers, Justice Dickson sought to give effect to their intended meanings, and not to innovate or interject his own preferences. This is reflected in Meredith where he wrote:
As a preliminary matter, we emphasize that the issues before this Court do not include the public policy merits of the school voucher program. Whether the Indiana program is wise educational or public policy is not a consideration germane to the narrow issues of Indiana constitutional law that are before us. Our individual policy preferences are not relevant. In the absence of a constitutional violation, the desirability and efficacy of school choice are matters to be resolved through the political process.
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His meticulous application of the court's interpretive methodology, his careful study of the relevant primary and secondary materials, and his search for the intended meanings of the framers and the ratifiers thus reflect a desire to give effect to the meanings expressed by others and a conscious effort to set aside personal values and subjective beliefs. In other words, the careful and orderly manner in which he approached the task of constitutional interpretation reveals a commitment to the rule of law and to principles, values, standards, and structures established in the law by others.
The Independent Meaning of the State Constitution-Being Faithful to the Meanings Intended by
Others.-By diligently searching for the understanding of the Indiana Constitution that was shared by those who framed and those who ratified it, Justice Dickson sought to understand the seven distinct religion provisions of the Indiana Constitution on their own terms. Consequently, in City Chapel, where the parties asked the court to determine whether First Amendment jurisprudence governs the interpretation of Indiana's religion provisions, Justice Dickson studied the Indiana Constitution as fundamental law that is separate from 173. See supra Parts IV.B, IV.C, IV.D, and IV.E. For a discussion of the court's methodology, see supra Part III.
174. 984 N.E.2d at 1216.
